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9. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Paul de Hert,  Bert-Jaap Koops  and Ronald Leenes  1 2 3
9.1. General 
This book contains seven country reports, covering Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the US. Every chapter studies the changes in 
constitutional rights and human-rights policy related to developments in ICT and other 
new technologies. The main focus is on the constitutional rights to privacy and data 
protection, inviolability of the body, inviolability of the home, secrecy of communication, 
and freedom of expression. As mentioned in the introduction, this study is a sequel to an 
earlier study carried out in 1999-2000 under supervision of Alis Koekkoek of Tilburg 
University.  The present study contains the same countries as the Koekkoek report, 4
extended with a chapter on the Netherlands. The central question in the present study is 
to identify which developments have taken place in the countries at issue with respect to 
constitutional rights and new technologies, in particular since 2000. Knowledge of these 
developments may help countries in adapting or updating their Constitution, as it 
provides inspiration for diverging strategies to achieve functionally equivalent results, 
i.e., the continued protection of the widely shared constitutional values of privacy and 
freedom of expression. 
9.2. General constitutional characteristics and developments 
9.2.1. Little constitutional dynamics as a general trend 
A first sub-question dealt with in all the country reports is general and concerns the 
nature and main characteristics of the six constitutional systems and the changes 
therein, in particular since 2000, for instance with respect to constitutional review, 
horizontal effect, or the influence of international law. The chapters show that there are 
several constitutional systems with hardly any change, and a few with some dynamics.  5
The US is an example of a very stable system. Their ‘rigid’ constitution is very steadfast, 
and no significant amendments have been added or proposed. The Supreme Court has 
produced several relevant judgments that keep the interpretation of the Constitution up-
to-date in light of technological developments. The Netherlands is an example of a 
country where considerable debate has taken place on amending the Constitution in 
light of the ‘digital age’, but even there, despite several Bills having been drafted, the 
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Constitution has yet to be amended. Belgium is an example of a country that used to be 
very static from a constitutional point of view, but has started to incorporate many 
changes. Its original 1831 Constitution has received several important revisions between 
1970-1993 in order to transform the Unitarian state into a federal state with a plurality of 
legislative bodies with distinct competences, and governments. In addition, the 
Constitution was enriched with certain fundamental rights relevant to this study in 
1993-1994 and in 2000. Moreover, the Court of Arbitration, operational since 1984 as an 
arbiter between the different legislative bodies, became a full Constitutional Court in 
2004. Even in Belgium, however, technological developments have not been a primary 
trigger for constitutional amendments, and the fact that this country has been the most 
dynamic in constitutional change since 2000 among the countries surveyed in this book, 
indicates that new technologies have overall had little impact on constitutional changes 
over the past years.  
The lack of profound constitutional changes in the countries surveyed has without 
doubt an institutional logic. Constitutions generally have a ‘rigid’ status and are not 
meant to be amended or altered swiftly. This seems to be even more the case in federal 
systems with a delicate power balance between different governments. The US, for 
example, where the Constitution is still in function more or less in its original form, is a 
case in point. The Canadian fundamental rights, as formulated in the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982), are extremely difficult to 
amend, since the consent of the Parliament is needed together with the agreement of 
seven to ten provincial legislative assemblies representing more than 50 percent of the 
population.   6
Another reason that none of the countries have undergone profound constitutional 
changes due to the emergence of new technologies, is that most constitutional rights, 
unlike Article 7 and 13 of the Dutch Constitution, are drafted in general terms broad 
enough to encompass new technologies. Freedom of expression and the right to 
secrecy of communications, for example, are usually worded in a technology-neutral way 
or, for instance in Sweden, with open endings like ‘and other technical recordings’ and 
‘or other confidential communications’. Many country reporters stress the importance of 
technology neutrality in constitutional protection, given the usually complex process of 
amending the Constitution. At the same time, as Magnusson Sjöberg warns, technology 
neutrality poses the risk of constitutional rights becoming very vague and thereby diluting 
constitutional protection. In that respect, open-ended formulations are to be preferred 
over overall abstract formulations.  7
Still, the technology neutrality of most constitutional rights does not account wholly for 
the lack of dynamics. The chapters seem to suggest that developments in ICT and new 
technologies are often not looked at a from a constitutional or human-rights perspective, 
perhaps with the exception of general privacy issues. This seems to be especially the 
case for countries with older constitutions (Sweden, the US, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands). These texts often tend to be smaller, more concise and less value-driven. 
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The more pragmatic approach of Belgium contrasts heavily with the more principled 
approach of Germany and France, for instance in the area of biomedical technologies. It 
is not possible at this stage to assess these differences. One could also hold that the 
seemingly pragmatic approach in Belgium is inspired by the liberal value of freedom 
(e.g., to sell one’s organs or to alter one’s body) that dominated most nineteenth-century 
Constitutions.  
The impression nevertheless remains: technology seemingly produces little 
constitutional dynamics. This is not to say that constitutions are entirely dormant. In 
France and Germany, for example, constitutional rights play a fairly active role in 
debates. In Germany, this is due to the presence of many (post-Wold War II) value-
driven constitutional rights, whereas in France, this results from more procedural basic 
rules, such as the rule that the legislator is obliged to define the guarantees to the 
exercise of fundamental rights and liberties. Hesitations by the legislator to fulfil this role 
account for most of the constitutional case-law produced by the French Constitutional 
Council in the area of new technologies. 
9.2.2. The impact of international legal instruments 
International human-rights treaties such as the European Convention of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and the UN International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) play an important role in the constitutional tradition of the 
European countries in this survey. In Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, 
directly binding rights from international treaties, which are sometimes absent in the 
national constitutions, play a major role. The ECHR is more specific with regard to the 
possibilities for limitation, whereas the national constitutions tend to emphasise the 
existence of rights as such and usually do not go beyond the requirement that limitations 
have to have a legal basis.  
Although not all of these European countries belong to the monist tradition (like the 
Netherlands), they are all eager to have cases decided in accordance with the case-law 
of the European Court of Human Rights. This situation stands in a striking contrast with 
the ethics of the US Supreme Court which, as a rule, does not refer to international 
treaties or case-law of foreign or international courts. Limitations to US constitutional 
rights do not resemble the European approach. The First Amendment with regard to 
freedom of expression omits every mention of the possibility to restrict this right, and the 
Fourth Amendment has its own particular requirements regarding limitations.  
The open attitude in the European reporting countries also concerns acts and 
initiatives generated not by the Council of Europe, but by the European Union. Very 
often, ordinary legislation with regard to technological developments is enacted as a 
result of obligations created by regulations and directives (first pillar) or by decisions and 
framework decisions (third pillar). The position of the French Constitutional Council not 
to supervise national laws that implement European initiatives might be problematic from 
a constitutional point of view with regard to third-pillar ‘laws’ enacted without co-decision 
power of the European Parliament and without effective judicial control by the European 
Court of Justice.  However that may be, the omnipresence of the European law-maker in 8
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areas affected by technological change likely also contributes to the lack of national 
constitutional activity discussed above.  
9.2.3. Constitutional review 
We have already observed that most reporting countries have constitutional rights with 
an open texture that apply in one way or another to the use of new technologies. In 
addition, all reporting countries have a system of constitutional review, ranging from 
unlimited variants, such as the US (all courts without limitation in time), to more limited 
variants, such as France (only the Constitutional Council before or six months after 
adoption of the text of the law). The chapters do not allow concluding on the eligibility of 
a particular form of constitutional review. From a theoretical perspective, one could 
argue that the continuous development of technology does not allow a court to decide on 
the constitutional nature of a given law in too short a period of time, but this argument is 
not supported in practice by the French chapter, which shows an active constitutional 
court unhampered by the requirement to demand constitutional review within six months 
of enactment of a law. 
What the chapters do show, however, is the importance of having one form of 
constitutional review or other in the first place, and this is a major point of attention for 
the Netherlands. Particularly now that Belgium has recently opted for a fairly broad form 
of constitutional review, the Netherlands have become rather isolated on the Western 
constitutional scene by their prohibition of constitutional review (Art. 120 Gw). Despite 
recommendations by the Koekkoek report, the CFRDA, and the ‘National Convention’, 
constitutional review is still not possible in the Netherlands.  As constitutions are 9
amended to update the constitutional rights in light of new technologies – particularly if 
they are made considerably technology-neutral, like intended in the Dutch proposals, 
and hence give less concrete guidance with respect to specific technological 
developments –, constitutional review is an important safeguard for effectuating 
constitutional protection in actual practice. 
Having said this, it should be noted that constitutional review does not solve all problems. It 
allows the courts to keep the Constitution alive and to keep a check on the legislative activities of 
the legislature, but it can also function as a restraint on constitutional vitality. The US chapter 
clearly spells out a backward evolution with regard to judicial activism: most of the expanding 
interpretations of existing rights are set back by the present Court with its more conservative 
composition. Effective human-rights protection therefore cannot rely solely on the eagerness of 
judges to apply constitutional principles to the society of today. Judges also need to work on the 
basis of constitutional texts and principles that guide them through their work, and hence, 
constitutions should have truly guiding principles and should not become too abstract or too 
general. 
9.2.4. Horizontal effect 
Technology is not an instrument specifically for governments; citizens depend on the use 
of technology at least as much. None of the constitutions of the reporting countries, 
however, contain any clause relating to the horizontal effect of fundamental rights.  10
Constitutional law seems to be devised as an instrument to regulate vertical relations 
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and to protect citizen against governmental power abuses. It is clear that similar power 
abuses can occur by private actors, including businesses, but this has not had a clear 
effect on constitutional protection at large. Most reporting countries address the issue of 
horizontal effect by assuming in one way or another that it is up to the legislator to 
convert fundamental-rights protection into specific legal norms that apply between 
citizens, for example in data-protection acts.  
9.3. Privacy  
9.3.1. General 
The right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Canadian, US, France, German, 
and Swedish constitutions, but it is recognised as being a part of the constitutional 
heritage in all the reporting countries. Belgium has, like the Netherlands, a general 
privacy right, albeit of a more recent date. The 1994 insertion of this right in Article 22 of 
the Belgian Constitution is remarkable, but in line with our observation above that 
constitutions in Europe tend to be sparing in possibilities to limit rights: it copies the 
general wordings of the right as formulated in Article 8 paragraph 1 ECHR, but omits the 
limitation grounds of paragraph 2 of this article. When Belgium adopted the amendment, 
it was asserted that the right and its limits should be understood along the lines of the 
ECHR and its case-law. It is unclear whether such a use of supranational constitutional 
law at the expense of national constitutional law is ultimately beneficial to privacy 
protection. Given the fact that many chapters indicate that proportionality is at the heart 
of constitution-related privacy debates, it can be recommended to codify at least this 
criterion, if not other elements of Article 8 ECHR, in national constitutions, as an 
unequivocal order to the legislator to explain the proportionality of proposed privacy-
infringing laws.  
Privacy in general is expressed in different terms and is constructed differently in the 
reporting countries. In Germany, where neither privacy nor data protection are 
mentioned in the Constitution, its source is Article 2 paragraph 1 (liberty) and Article 1 
(human dignity). In France, the source of privacy is not human dignity but liberty. 
Besides an implicit recognition by the Council in 1997, privacy was more explicitly 
recognised in French constitutional law in 1995-1999 as a part of the more generic right 
to individual liberty (Art. 66 Constitution) and rooted in Article 2 of the 1789 Declaration 
of Man and the Citizen: the right to liberty as an unalienable human right.  
It is hard to assess the implications of these different expressions of the right to 
privacy and to put into question the formulation of the right to privacy as an independent 
right in the ECHR and in the Dutch and Belgian constitutions. It is neverthelss clear that 
the choice of Article 1 of the German Constitution (hereinafter: GG) as a source for the 
right to privacy is important for its strong position in German constitutional law. The US 
chapter clearly demonstrates the weakness of privacy when it is not provided for 
explicitly in the constitution: privacy protection is built up and broken down by judges and 
can therefore fluctuate significantly. 
The main constitutional provision in both Canada and the US where privacy is read 
into, is the provision protecting against unreasonable search and seizure. The chapters 
suggest that this right is formulated in terms that are perhaps too physical, but the cases 
quoted show that the wordings are (still?) open enough for the courts to apply them in a 
rapidly changing world. A crucial element in both rights is that they protect people, not 
places. This approach has significant advantages in a technology-driven world where 
traditional notions of place become blurred. In a world of Ambient Intelligence, ‘place’ 
becomes something centering on people rather than on physical objects or geographical 
locations, since the surroundings change along with the people acting in them.  11
Courts in Canada and the US also use the criterion of ‘reasonable expectations of 
privacy’ to determine whether certain measures are unreasonable. Its application, 
especially in the US, seems rather tricky for privacy protection in a rapidly changing 
world where technology permeates everyday life. As technology develops, the 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ develops along with it, generally to the detriment of 
privacy as technology of itself tends to decrease privacy expectations.  An example is 12
the Kyllo case in the US, where the Supreme Court used the criterion of a device being 
‘in general use’ to determine whether or not it infringed privacy;  as most technology 13
applications tend to develop from limited, sectoral use to general, public use, the related 
privacy expectations at one point in time will become unreasonable. Hence, using 
‘reasonable expectations of privacy’ to face developments in technology poses the risk 
of a slow but certain erosion of privacy. Although the criterion is not wholly absent in the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights,  courts and legislatures should be 14
cautious in applying it in the field of technology law. 
9.3.2. Data protection 
Recently, the role of data protection proper has received constitutional recognition in the 
EU Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union.  In the Charter, a separate 15
right to data protection has been recognised apart from a right to a private life for the 
individual. The right to have personal data protected is, however, not explicitly mentioned 
in most constitutions of the reporting states, with the exception of Sweden (Ch. 2, Art. 3, 
para. 2 Instrument of Government) and the Netherlands (Art. 10 paras. 2-3 Gw). 
Nevertheless, it is recognised as part of the constitutional heritage in all the reporting 
countries, and the incorporation in the EU Charter may be a sign of growing recognition 
for data protection as a constitutional right. Whether it will further develop as an 
autonomous right independent from privacy  remains to be seen: the chapters show 16
that in most countries, data protection is (still) largely discussed in the context of privacy.  
In Germany, the right to informational self-determination is a stand-alone right next to 
privacy. In France and Canada, the data-protection laws have a quasi-constitutional 
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status. The French Data Protection Act is of a general nature. In Canada, the 1983 
Privacy Act was designed to protect personal data in the federal public sector, whereas 
the 2000 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act was enacted to 
protect personal information in the private sector; only the first has quasi-constitutional 
value (it will trump other laws unless the other act addresses the privacy issues), the 
latter has the status of ordinary legislation. The 1995 EC Data Protection Directive 
primarily provides data protection in the European reporting countries.  Whereas 17
Canada has responded to this initiative by enacting similar legislation, the US has 
refrained from adopting general ordinary data-protection legislation. In US law, however, 
some basic principles of data protection familiar to the Canadian and European 
regulations are absent. As soon as one gives data away or shares them, legal protection 
stops. The purpose-limitation principle, i.e., the principle that data should be collected 
and processed according to a predefined goal or purpose, has not found firm ground in 
the US tradition.  
All chapters show the overall importance of data-protection principles as yardsticks to 
measure new developments. Constitutionalisation of these principles, in the line of the EU 
Charter, is therefore to be recommended. In that respect, it is worth mentioning that the protection 
of the EU Charter is more specific and more inclusive than the protection in the Dutch 
Constitution (Art. 10 para. 3 Gw), which does not, for instance, mention the role of the Data 
Protection Authority. Generally, one senses a reluctance of courts in many countries to apply 
data-protection principles to their fullest extent. This is partly compensated by the activities of the 
national Data Protection Authorities.  In the line of the EU Charter, it can therefore be 18
recommend to give these institutes constitutional recognition. Also, the pivotal role of the 
purpose-limitation principle in many debates, e.g., the debate about privacy versus security, also 
suggests that this principle should be part of the constitutional codification of data protection.  
Culture seems to be a factor of importance with regard to data protection. Although 
Sweden was the first state (after the German Land of Hessen) to enact a national data-
protection act (1973) and although Chapter 2, Article 3 of the Instrument of Government 
recognises that ‘every citizen shall be protected against any violation of integrity by 
automatic processing’, Swedish constitutionalism is dominated by the notion of 
transparency and access to government information. Sweden therefore struggles with 
the main principles of the European Data Protection Directive and is now proposing a 
more US-like data-protection regulation that does not focus on prevention, but on data 
abuse. The Swedish development warrants closer scrutiny: it can be questioned whether 
the European data-protection system, with its focus on a priori regulation of data 
collection and processing, can be upheld much longer in a world where data processing 
occurs in so many ways, to such an extent, and for so many purposes as it does today. 
Shifting the focus of legal protection to a posteriori regulation of data abuse might turn 
out to be a better strategy to protect individuals in the long run.  
In all reporting countries, specific issues have determined the constitutional privacy and 
data-protection agenda. These overlap only partially, except with regard to the issue of 
balancing privacy and security, which has triggered significant debates and legislative 
  See also Franken and Koekkoek, p. 1160.17
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activity in all countries. As a consequence of the September 11 attacks, many countries 
have adopted anti-terrorist laws, often but not always technology-related, that infringe 
privacy or data-protection principles. The chapters show some resistance by the 
constitutional courts against overintrusive government powers, for instance in Germany, 
where the Constitutional Court has tied video surveillance in public places to the 
requirement that there are objective indications of dangerousness of the place to be 
monitored. Also, some cases have taken into account the proportionality criterion in 
dealing with proposed measures. In general, however, constitutional rights have not 
functioned to substantially limit or block legislative proposals to extend government 
powers to enhance security. At the same time, it should be noted that in several 
countries, the move towards more security measures to the detriment of privacy started 
already before 9/11, even if the terrorist attacks seems to have speeded up certain 
measures.  
Besides ‘security versus privacy’, the following themes have been mentioned in the 
chapters: video surveillance (France, Germany, Belgium), the use of cameras on 
highways (France), electronic surveillance or the e-bracelet (France), biometrics 
(France), the processing of location data (France), profiling (the Netherlands), the impact 
of antiterrorism laws on other states (Canada), privacy competences of provinces in 
federal states (Canada, Belgium), access to government information versus data 
protection (Sweden), workplace privacy (Sweden), and genetic testing (Belgium, US).  
9.3.3. Inviolability of the home  
The inviolability of the home is covered explicitly as such in most European constitutions 
except the French, and via the protection against unreasonable searches in the 
Canadian and US systems. Although these provisions have not triggered much debate in 
the reporting countries with regard to technological developments, two observations can 
be made. 
The first regards the source of these provisions. Whereas French constitutional law 
considers the right to have the home protected as a component of individual liberty (Art. 
66), most other systems identify privacy as a basic value underlying the protection of the 
home. This view certainly corroborates the observation that if there is an inner and outer 
sphere of privacy, then the home belongs to the most inner sphere (in the German term: 
Kernbereich) of privacy. It is not unproblematic, however. Indeed, the right to have the 
home protected is much older in legal history than the right to privacy, which was only 
recognised as such in twentieth-century constitutions. In the nineteenth century, it was 
therefore held that the right to property was at the core of the values underlying the 
protection of the house. It is unclear from a digital-rights perspective whether the right to 
inviolability of the home should be conceived as an independent right based on a 
plurality of values (liberty, property, privacy, etc.) or as a privacy-specific right protecting 
not bricks but people. This issue certainly merits further debate.  
Second, linked to the foregoing, it appears that the current conception and wordings 
of the right to inviolability of the home is not technology-proof. The chapters identify 
problems with regular video surveillance in public places (the issues of homes is often 
addressed in this context), with satellite video surveillance, with RFID, with data relating 
to living conditions in houses (such as water and electricity bills), and with heat 
surveillance and other forms of scanning the home from the outside. Related to the 
latter, Article 13, paragraph 1 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) – ‘The home is 
inviolable’ – has been complemented with a paragraph to allow the use of wiretaps, 
bugs, and similar equipment in homes for fighting organised crime ‘provided that 
alternative methods of investigating the matter would be disproportionately difficult or 
unproductive’. Similar issues in other countries have given rise to case-law. The Belgian 
Constitutional Court made it clear in 2004 that police competences to use bugs in 
houses needed to fulfil all the requirements of regular physical searches. In Plant, the 
Canadian Court accepted an inquiry of the police, who suspected drug cultivation, to the 
electric-utility company to have data on the use of electric power, because there was no 
trust relation between the owner and the company. The protection of the home in Section 
8 Canadian Charter did not apply, because the electric reader did not reveal data on 
lifestyle but gave only primitive data. In Kyllo, the US Supreme Court saw a Fourth 
Amendment violation in the warrantless use of heat scans that monitored homes from 
the outside with devices not in general use. In Teslin, the Canadian court reached an 
opposite conclusion, arguing there was no reasonable expectation in heat that could be 
registered from outside homes; this technology did not reveal intimate details of lifestyle. 
This judgment seemingly contradicts the Kyllo findings, but the Canadian Court left the 
door open to find a reasonable expection of privacy in relation to more sophisticated 
technology. An issue not yet addressed in case-law is to what extent the inviolability of 
the home protects against hacking into or searching, by means of a network connection, 
personal computers located in the home.  
Both observations give rise to two questions that should be answered by 
constitutional legislators. First, are the spatial dimensions of terms such as ‘home’, 
‘search’, and ‘illegal trespassing’ technology-proof given the new means of monitoring 
the home from the outside in increasingly intrusive ways?  Second, what exactly is 19
being protected by the inviolability of the home: the place or the people? Property, liberty, 
or privacy, or a combination of all these? It is important to take a stance on this, with a 
view to longer-term developments like domotics, which make homes ‘intelligent’ and 
therefore more revealing of intimate life to outside snoopers, and Ambient Intelligence, 
where a personalised environment follows individuals as they move around, rather than 
that individuals have a fixed geographical basis for a private sphere in the form of their 
physical home. In the long run, the notion of ‘home’ may need to be adapted itself to 
denote the personalised sphere around an individual rather than a fixed, brick-and-
mortar place. 
9.3.4. Inviolability of the body 
The body is explicitly protected in the Constitutions of Canada, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden. The Belgian Constitution was amended in 2000 with a 
provision on the rights of children that includes protection of the body of the child. Other 
notions protecting the body are human dignity (France, Belgium), the right to life 
  Cf., Koops, et al. 2004.19
(Belgium), privacy (US, Belgium), and the privilege against self-incrimination (US) . 20
Canadian and German constitutional case-law suggest a high level of protection 
accorded to the body and to data related to the body. Canadian courts apply the rule that 
the closer something can be tied to the individual, the higher the expectation of privacy 
and the protection of the body. Thus, a handbag receives more protection than a school 
locker or a gym bag.  
The right to have the body protected has not triggered many technology-related 
debates. Most debates, for example, about taking DNA samples, electronic monitoring of 
detainees, and using biometrics, have been conducted in the context of the general right 
to privacy and to ordinary data-protection legislation. 
The notion of protection of the body is, however, particularly relevant for biomedical 
issues. Here, German and French law seem to be more principled and less pragmatic in 
their approach than the US, Sweden, and Belgium. The former systems let the notion of 
human dignity play a central role in these issues. In Germany, this right is rooted in the 
Constitution, whereas in France, it is recognised as a ‘guarding principle’ for 
constitutional rights and has been firmly incorporated in the Civil Code since 1994 
(Bioethics Act). Although it is not easy to determine whether the more principled 
approach of some systems or the more pragmatic approach of other systems is to be 
preferred, it is beyond doubt that, when endeavouring to involve constitutional rights in a 
more active way in biomedical developments, recognising human dignity can 
complement the right to protection of the body. It should, however, be noted that human 
dignity can be interpreted in a more or in a less liberal way. The current German 
interpretation, for example, prevents liberal abortion laws and gives heightened 
constitutional protection to the embryo, in contrast to the current European human-rights 
framework.  21
9.4. Communication-related rights  
9.4.1. Secrecy of communications 
The right to secrecy of communications is explicitly recognised at the constitutional level 
in Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Whereas the Netherlands protects letters, 
the telephone, and the telegraph (Art. 13 Gw), the former countries use a sufficiently 
technology-neutral formulation: ‘the privacy of correspondence, posts, and 
telecommunications’ (Germany) and ‘mail or other confidential correspondence, (…) 
telephone conversations or other confidential communications’ (Sweden) (emphasis 
added). In Belgium and France, the secrecy of communications is not regulated at the 
constitutional level but by lower legislation; Belgium only provides a constitutional 
protection of mail (letters). In Canada and the US, the secrecy of communications has 
been read into the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure. In 
  This may also be the case in Europe, where the European Court of Human Rights found the administering by the police 20
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be protected against inhuman or degrading treatment (Art. 3 ECHR) but also a violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination (Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR). See ECtHR 11 July 2006 (Jalloh v. Germany). 
  See also, in general, comparing a utilitarian, a human-rights, and a human-dignity approach to addressing biomedical-21
ethical issues and warning against a too principled ‘dignitarian’ approach, Somsen 2006. 
Canada, e-mail falls within the scope of this protection, albeit to a lower degree than 
letters, but in the US, constitutional protection of e-mail is still undecided. This is similar 
to France, where the protection of e-mail in ordinary legislation, as interpreted by the 
Constitutional Council, depends on the circumstances. In these countries, encryption of 
e-mail is likely a sufficient condition to invoke legal protection, but it is not a necessary 
condition: depending on other circumstances, unencrypted e-mail can also be 
considered secret.  22
 As with the inviolability of the home, it is relevant to consider the exact nature of 
what is being protected: the communication itself, the place where the communication 
takes place, or the medium over which the communication is transported? The 
importance of this issue is borne out by the Dutch discussions, where different 
interpretations of the nature of the protection lead to differing proposals for reformulating 
the constitutional provision.  The US approach, similar to the Canadian approach, that 23
the Fourth Amendment protects ‘people, not places’ was established in the Katz decision 
on wiretapping. This remark referred, however, primarily to the place where the 
interception occurred: a public phone booth, arguing that people can have a reasonable 
expection of privacy even in a public space. This gives little guidance as to the core of 
the protection, but it is presumably closer related to protecting the sender or recipient of 
a communication and the communication itself than to protecting the medium 
transporting the message.  
The German approach differs in this respect. The German Constitution protects the 
confidentiality of individual communications that depend on a third party for transmission; 
it principally covers all forms of mediated communication for the period of the transport. 
It is, hence, the channel that is protected rather than the communication as such. The 
French protection in ordinary legislation seems to be based on the same approach of 
transport protection. This ‘channel’ approach has advantages in that it provides more 
legal certainty what kind of communications are protected, namely all communications 
transported across media that are protected as such, like the telephone. In the 
‘communication’ approach, the medium is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition: 
protection has to be determined on a case-by-case basis, by looking at all relevant 
aspects of the communication itself. A channel approach is, however, more difficult to 
maintain as media converge. This is visible in Germany, where only individual 
communications are protected and not mass communications (such as broadcasts): this 
distinction is blurred now that communications infrastructures converge (e.g., 
narrowcasting on TV infrastructures, broadcasting on the Internet, and types of 
communication on the Internet, such as blogging or communicating in large-scale but 
‘closed’ communities like Hyves, that are not easy to call individual or mass).  
On the basis of the chapters, it can therefore not be recommended to choose either a 
‘communication’ approach or a ‘channel’ approach, but it is advisable that constitutional 
legislators at least make an explicit and argued choice in this matter, to provide as much 
legal certainty as possible in this complex area. 
  Compare the Weir case in Canada, supra 3.5.1. 22
  See supra 6.5.1. 23
Traffic data and data retention 
A relevant issue is to what extent the constitutional protection of secrecy of 
communications covers traffic data (such as number, time, and – with mobile 
communications – location of a call). Generally, the reporting countries make a 
distinction between the content of communication and traffic data. There seems to be a 
traditional tendency in most countries to consider the latter less privacy-sensitive than 
the former, although the literature in some countries increasingly argues that traffic data 
should be considered equally privacy-sensitive.  In Germany and Belgium, traffic data 24
fall within the scope of secrecy of communications (Art. 10 GG, Art. 122 et seq. Belgian 
Electronic Communications Act of 2005).  In the Netherlands, however, traffic data are 25
seen as part of privacy and data protection instead (Art. 10 Gw). In Canada and the US, 
traffic data are treated – like the content of communications – in the context of 
unreasonable search and seizure, but with different outcomes: whereas the US denies 
constitutional, Fourth Amendment, protection to traffic data outright, Canada assigns 
some constitutional, Section 8, protection to traffic data, albeit to a lower extent than 
communication content.  
Given these varying constitutional approaches, it is hard to recommend how exactly 
traffic data should be protected at the constitutional level; perhaps it is ultimately a 
matter of choice to be made in light of the national interpretation of rights to secrecy of 
communications, privacy, data protection, and protection from unreasonable search and 
seizure. It should also be noted that, however varying the constitutional approaches may 
be, the material protection for traffic data does not necessarily differ that much in 
practice, since it is usually provided by ordinary legislation; the US ECPA, for example, 
offers more protection than the Fourth Amendment Katz standard. 
A topical issue is data retention: the requirement for telecommunications providers to 
store traffic data for a certain period, as a measure to combat serious crime and 
terrorism. Significantly enough, this measure is only taken in Europe, with the 2006 Data 
Retention Directive;  it does not feature in the US anti-terrorism PATRIOT Act, and there 26
are no proposals considering data retention in the US or in Canada. In Europe, France 
and Belgium had enacted data-retention legislation before the EC Directive. In France, 
the application Decree bringing into force this part of the Daily Safety Act was published 
in 2006, and ultimately approved by the CNIL as being constitutionally acceptable, given 
the limitations in the law of purpose-specification and duration. In Belgium, the 
implementing decree for Article 126 Electronic Communication Act is still in preparation. 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden will have to draft implementation laws. From a 
constitutional perspective, it is relevant to note that a motion was rejected by the 
German Parliament to request the government to challenge the directive at the 
  In the context of the Lawful Access Initiative in Canada, scholars argue that traffic data can be just as privacy-sensitive as 24
the content of communications, see supra 3.5.1. In the Dutch context, see supra 6.5.1; also cf., the annotation by Egbert 
Dommering under ECtHR 25 September 2001 (P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom), Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2003, No. 
670, available at http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/dommering/ehrm25sep2001.html. 
  Cf., the European Court of Human Rights, which treats traffic data as part of the right to respect for ‘correspondence’ in 25
Art. 8 ECHR. See, e.g., ECtHR 2 August 1984 (Malone v. United Kingdom) and ECtHR 25 September 2001 (P.G. & J.H. 
v. United Kingdom). 
  European Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006 on data retention.26
European Court of Justice,  but that several groups and individuals have announced to 27
challenge the future German transposition law before the Constitutional Court.  28
9.4.2. Freedom of expression 
The freedom of expression is an important constitutional rights in all reporting countries. 
The scope of the right differs, however. In France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
US, the right focuses on the expression or communication of thoughts and opinions. 
Canada has a more encompassing right, covering also the freedom to hold thoughts and 
beliefs; Belgium is similar in that it creates the freedom of expression along with the 
freedom of worship (Art. 19 Belgian Constitution). Germany also stipulates a 
constitutional right to gather information, to stimulate the forming of thoughts and 
opinions.  
 Despite the overall importance of the freedom of expression and the largely 
similar culture in the reporting countries to favour openness and public debate over 
censorship, each country distinguishes certain types of speech that are excluded from 
protection. Several of these are shared by most countries, such as – in the US 
terminology – ‘true threats’, defamation, and child pornography (in all reporting 
countries), and hate speech (in all except the US). Other categories are more specific for 
certain countries, such as political speech (banned in Canada in the 20-hour period 
preceding the closing of polls, given the vastness and time zones of the country), court 
proceedings (which in certain cases cannot be published in Canada), and commercial 
speech (which has a lower standard of protection in the US and is completely excluded 
in the Netherlands). For virtual child pornography, it is noteworthy that a US law banning 
this was struck down as unconstitutional; the constitutionality of a subsequent, more 
strictly formulated but functionally equivalent, criminalisation has so far not been decided 
in court. In the other reporting countries, several of which have also criminalised virtual 
child porn in the wake of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, the 
constitutionality of these prohibitions does not seem to be an issue.  
 Particularly relevant in the context of this report is the freedom of media that 
express or transmit opinions. Article 7 para 1 of the Dutch Constitution specifically 
addresses freedom of the press, whereas para 2 deals with broadcasting through radio 
and television and para 3 protects other means of expression. It is unclear if, and if so 
under which provision, expression of ideas and opinions by means of digital media such 
as the internet, is protected. In case-law, the courts include both Article 7 Gw and Article 
10 EHCR into their consideration without specifying which part of Article 7 applies. Article 
25 of the Belgian Constitution is restricted to freedom of the press, which tends to be 
associated with the printing press, and courts are reluctant to interpret this to cover new 
media. The US First Amendment also only mentions freedom of the press, but this is 
interpreted much more broadly than in Belgium, and there is no debate that the right is 
formulated in too technology-specific a way. The German Constitution, in Article 5, 
  See http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/16/016/1601622.pdf. 27
  See http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number4.10/dataretentionde. Outside the scope of this survey, but relevant to note in 28
this respect, is the case brought before the Irish High Court against the Irish government by Digital Rights Ireland, 
challenging the Irish data-retention law and the EC Directive as unconstitutional. See http://www.digitalrights.ie/category/
data-retention/.
mentions the freedom of the press and the freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts 
and films, thus distinguishing the press from audiovisual media. Given a similar 
distinction in French ordinary legislation, the Internet has triggered a restructuring of 
French media law, which now has a general category of ‘electronic public 
communications’, which is divided in two sub-categories: ‘audiovisual 
communications’ (subject to the Freedom of Communications Act), and ‘on-line public 
communications’ (subject to the Trust in the Digital Economy Act). Canada and Sweden 
have no problems with new technologies, since they use open-ended formulations: ‘and 
other forms of communication’ (Canada), ‘and certain like transmissions, (…) and other 
technical recordings’ (Sweden). Nevertheless, given the fact that Swedish constitutional 
protection of freedom of speech is spread across two constitutional laws, the Freedom of 
the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression, an inquiry is on-
going to merge these laws.  
 The Internet raises several questions with respect to the freedom of expression. 
A primary topic is the categorisation of bloggers. On the one hand, they serve a purpose 
very similar to journalists in the printed press, by fostering the collection and spreading 
of information, ideas, and opinions, and therefore may well, in the longer term, turn out 
to be equally valuable for the public debate as traditional media, or perhaps even more 
valuable. On the other hand, on the Internet, everyone can start a blog and call herself a 
journalist. The reporting countries are tentatively coming to terms with defining bloggers. 
In Belgium, the criterion of ‘everyone who directly contributes (…) information aimed at 
the public via a medium’ has been formulated to trigger applicability of the Act on the 
protection of journalistic sources, thus in principle covering bloggers as well. In Canada, 
courts tend to apply a broad definition of journalism as well in relation to new media.  In 29
Sweden, a more material criterion is used, namely that information be ‘of importance to 
the public debate’ in order to be protected by the freedom of expression;  this allows 30
courts to assess bloggers – and other expressers of opinions on new media – on a case-
by-base basis in light of the rationale of the constitutional protection. With converging 
media, this seems a more sustainable approach than a media-centered type of 
protection. 
 Other interesting Internet-related issues with respect to the freedom of 
expression are the distinction between static and interactive websites (in Sweden, only 
static websites fall within the scope of the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression), 
the liability for hyperlinks that link to prohibited speech (Germany: no liability because 
the hyperlinker aimed at faciliting people to form an opinion; France: liability because the 
hyperlinker had explicit knowledge of or advertised the linked content), the liabiliity of 
ISPs (in France, the Netherlands, and Canada), the impact of search engines (the 
Netherlands), and filtering systems (Canada). Also noteworthy are the activities in 
France and Belgium for the protection of minors on the Internet.  
 On the basis of the reports, it can be recommended that the freedom of 
expression – possibly strengthened by the freedom to gather information and to hold 
beliefs and opinions – is formulated in a sufficiently media-neutral way. An enumeration 
  Jason Young, communication at the 1 December 2006 workshop.29
  Cecilia Magnusson Sjöberg, communication at the 1 December 2006 workshop. 30
of media with an open-ended formulation – like the Canadian ‘and other forms of 
communication’ – seems particularly apt to strike a balance between legal certainty (for 
media that should be protected in any case) and technology neutrality (for media that 
may also need to be protected, perhaps through future technological developments). 
Given the increasing convergence of media and the rise of new ways of expression, 
such as blogging, that blur traditional concepts like ‘journalist’, it is also useful to 
consider including, besides or instead of the mentioning of media, a material criterion, 
such as ‘of importance to the public debate’, that judges can use to decide whether in a 
concrete case a communication serves the values underlying the freedom of expression.  
9.5. Other and new constitutional rights 
The chapters have also mentioned several other constitutional rights as being affected 
by new technologies. Apart from the right to anonymity, which all reporters touched upon 
as it closely relates to both privacy and freedom of expression, and which we therefore 
treat separately in this section, no general conclusions can be drawn from the chapters, 
since the reporters were asked to focus on the privacy-related and communications-
related rights and to go into other rights only as far as time and expertise were available.  
9.5.1. Right to anonymity 
Although anonymity is a topic of debate in all reporting countries, none of the countries 
acknowledges a general right, constitutional or otherwise, to anonymity. It is, however, 
often a subsidiary or a derivative of constitutional rights. There exists, to some extent, a 
constitution-related right to anonymity in the context of privacy (in France), data 
protection (in the form of the right to informational self-determination, in Germany), the 
secrecy of communications (in Germany), free speech (in the Netherlands, Canada, and 
the US), and the right to individual liberty (which, in France, includes the freedom to 
come and go anonymously). This right is far from absolute: numerous exceptions are 
made, such as a legal obligation for bloggers to inform the hosting provider of their 
identity (France), a ban on equipment that obstructs caller-identification in 
telecommunications (Belgium), and a prohibition of anonymous political advertising 
(Canada). Also, discussions about revealing the identity of unknown or pseudonymous 
Internet users alledgedly infringing copyright or committing a content-related crime 
online, can be witnessed in all countries, often allowing the lifting of anonymity of the 
purported offender. A conclusion that can be tentatively drawn from this overview is that 
anonymity tends to be protected in most countries as a not unimportant value, also at 
the constitutional level, but that infringements of anonymity are generally easily 
accepted. It is therefore not possible, on the basis of the chapters, to conclude that a 
‘right’ to anonymity exists; rather, it plays a role as a value in the context of several other 
constitutional rights.  
9.5.2. Various 
Various constitutional rights and issues are mentioned in the chapters as being 
potentially affected by new technologies. We give a brief overview here.  
The freedom of assembly is possibly relevant for on-line demonstrations or virtual sit-
ins, as was argued by the Dutch CFRDA; however, a lower court in Germany declined 
applicability. The freedom of association can apply to new media, although banning 
associations from a virtual game by game providers might be quite lawful (as argued in 
Dutch literature). The right to petition ‘in writing’ was interpreted in the Netherlands as 
also covering petitions by electronic means. Equal treatment (Art. 10-11 Belgian 
Constitution) was an issue in Belgium when the Official Journal (Belgisch Staatsblad) 
was transformed into an on-line publication, impacting the accessibility of the journal in 
an unconstitutional way. Computer games raise questions about the applicability of 
personality rights, such as portrait rights, and the freedom of art; a German lower court 
held that a computer game could claim the constitutional right to freedom of art, but the 
appeal court found that even so, a celebrity’s consent was needed to use his name in 
the game. In the United States, a right to experimental, potentially life-saving, medication 
was invoked even if the drugs had not passed all tests for FDA approval. In France, the 
right to be forgotten is mentioned for underage offenders.  
In the criminal-law context, the criminal legality principle (no crime without prior law, 
Art. 12 Belgian Constitution) is relevant in that it requires precise law-making, so that 
citizens can foresee what is punishable and how they can be investigated. In the Belgian 
Computer Crime Act, the formulation of ‘any other technological means’ was used in an 
attempt to make the description technology-neutral. This meets the legality principle on 
the face of it, since all ‘technical’ crimes are covered, but at the same time, foreseeability 
is not guaranteed with such an open ending. Also in the criminal context, in the US, the 
privilege against self-incrimination (Fifth Amendment) is relevant in relation to 
technology, for instance in the context of a power to compel citizens to hand over 
encryption keys. Brenner argues that such a power would violate the Fifth Amendment 
unless the key (or password) was reduced to tangible, recorded form. Saliently enough, 
such a power, which has not been enacted in the US, does exist in France and Belgium, 
but in these countries, the power to force suspects to decrypt has so far not been 
challenged as infringing the privilege against self-incrimination.  31
In the context of electronic government, various issues spring to attention. Notable 
first of all is the right to access public information, which is a constitutional right in both 
Belgium and Sweden; in the Netherlands, a Bill to introduce this right in the Constitution 
is expected. Whereas the Dutch proposals speak of ‘public information’, the other 
countries use the term ‘document’. In Belgium, this has been interpreted broadly to cover 
all kinds of documents regardless of the storage medium, whereas in Sweden, the term 
‘recording’, used alongside ‘written or pictorial matter’ in the definition of ‘document’, 
refers to electronic documents. ‘Recordings’ in Sweden can be ready-made (such as e-
mail messages) or compilations (like merged data bases); compilations only fall within 
the scope of the right to access public information if the government can make them 
accessible ‘using routine means’. In Sweden, also the storage and deletion of official 
electronic documents has been called attention to in the context of the right to access 
public information.  
  The privilege against self-incrimination is not always recognised at the constitutional level in European countries, but it is 31
at the core of the constitutional right to a fair trial as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, since its first 
acknowledgement in ECtHR 25 February 1993 (Funke v. France). 
Another relevant rights in the context of e-government is the right to vote. In Belgium, 
the law was adapted in 1998 to allow voting machines, without debate; in the US, a few 
civil-law suits arguing that flawed voting machines violated their right to vote were 
denied. E-voting has been discussed and briefly experimented with in France as an 
alternative to distance-voting. In the Netherlands, which has a long history of using 
voting machines, serious debates about secrecy of the ballot have only started in 2006 
as a result of studies regarding the security measures of these voting machines and the 
possibilities of secretly eavesdropping on the votes cast. 
Finally, a fundamental issue outside the field of human rights has been raised in the 
Swedish chapter. The power to enact laws is constitutionally attributed to the legislator 
(the Riksdag, and sometimes the Government or by delegation another public authority). 
The increasing use of computer-assisted and computer-executed legal decisions, 
notably in the field of administrative law, raises the question whether and to what extent 
the programs used for these decisions, in which rules are embedded, should be seen as 
enacted laws. After all, the legal rules of law proper are not trivially translatable into 
technical, computer-logical rules, and hence, programming constitutes a degree of 
autonomous rule-making. This requires a check on the conformity of the resulting 
program rules with the legal rules and on the constitutional authority underlying the 
technical rule-making process. Related to this is the issue in Sweden of the distribution 
of competence between local and central authorities: if administrative decisions are 
largely the result of centralised information systems, the constitutional task of local 
governments to take indivdidual administrative decisions is at risk. 
9.5.3. Conclusion 
Although no general conclusions can be drawn from this brief overview, two 
observations can be made on the basis of the mentioning in the chapters of other rights. 
First, the challenges that new technologies pose to constitutional law are wide-ranging 
and go deeper than merely the occurrence of technology-specific formulations in 
constitutional provisions. The issues mentioned range from traditional, age-old 
constitutional rights like the freedom of assembly and the right to vote to more recent or 
even new rights, such as the right to access government information and the right to be 
forgotten. What is more, they also relate to constitutional issues outside the field of 
human rights, such as the division of power within the government.  
Second, despite the wide range of issues touched upon, the issues signaled by and 
large relate to developments in the near rather than the distant future, and they tend to 
involve ICT rather than other new technologies. This may well be caused by the 
background of the reporters, all of whom have a track record in the field of ICT law in 
particular, but it could also be an indication that biotechnology and genetics, 
nanotechnology, and the convergence of nano, bio, information, and cognitive sciences 
(NBIC) have as yet caused little discussions in relation to constitutional rights. The long-
term impact of these developments on fundamental issues, for example, whether 
cyborgs and robotics necessitate a rethinking of the concept of the bearer of 
constitutional (‘human’) rights, or the effect of NBIC on legal notions based on the 
concept of free will, has to our knowledge not been discussed in any detail in literature or 
in constitutional-policy debates.  
9.6. Conclusion  
New technologies challenge constitutional rights. This is particularly visible in the Dutch 
context, where the technology-specific formulation of several constitutional rights 
necessitates an adaptation of the Constitution. In the other countries covered in this 
report, however, the text of the Constitution itself is hardly at issue. In some countries, a 
few adaptations have been made to bring the formulation up-to-date in light of new 
technologies, but no such adaptation has occurred since 2000, and no need is currently 
felt to adapt the Constitution – with the possible exception of the Belgian freedom of the 
‘press’. Generally, constitutional rights are sufficiently technology-neutral, because they 
are abstractly worded or use open endings (notably in Sweden), use guiding principles 
like a general right to personality (Germany), or are kept up-to-date by constitutional or 
other courts who can interpret the rights by deviating from a literal reading (US, 
Canada). Constitutional review is also, in varying forms, a primary feature of all except 
the Dutch constitutional systems covered in this report that explains the lack of need to 
modify the constitution itself.  
Besides a lack of constitutional amendments, a general trend is perceptible of low 
constitutional dynamics. Some countries, notably Belgium, have seen a relatively vibrant 
constitutional activity in the past few years, with a full-blown Constitutional Court as a 
result, but in most countries, constitutional rights do not seem to play a key role in 
debates over new technologies, at least, on the face of it.  A second look at many of the 32
issues covered in this report shows that constitutional values related to privacy and 
freedom of communication do feed technology-related policy, legislation, and case-law, 
but often without reference to specific constitutional rights. In other words, constitutional 
values are important for technology policy and law, but in an indirect way: they often play 
a role in an implicit way, and through other, non-constitutional legislation that embeds 
and implements constitutional rights.  
This is hopeful, because new technologies pose challenges, if not to Constitutions as 
such, to all areas of the law. In shaping the law and legal policy to face future, 
technology-related developments, constitutional values are urgently needed to help 
guide society through a process that will certainly bring radical changes, particularly 
since it is hard to foresee which changes exactly will be brought about by new 
technologies. Constitutional rights are core values that define what human beings and 
society are and should be. Therefore, even if constitutional rights are far from dormant, 
legislatures and policy-makers would do well to more explicitly refer to constitutional 
rights in their activities, and to create an environment in which constitutional rights can 
flourish and guide society along.  
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